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This paper provides the first empirical evidence of fairness opinions in Europe. Legal 
requirements concerning the use of fairness opinions in mergers and acquisitions are 
significantly different in Germany, Switzerland and Austria. We examine the determinants of 
fairness opinions for target firms in these various regulatory settings, and moreover, 
investigate the impact of such opinions on the abnormal returns of target firms. While in 
Germany and Austria market participants do not deem fairness opinions important, they do 
create value for shareholders in Switzerland. Because conflicts of interest between the 
target’s board and bidder are a main determinant of fairness opinions in Switzerland, we 
conclude that when the target’s management faces such conflict, external expert advice 
replaces the board’s opinion on the offer. 
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∗ 
1. Introduction 
In a fairness opinion, an outside adviser deems whether a corporate transaction is financially 
adequate for its shareholders. In the United States, four out of five boards of directors of target 
firms decide to render a fairness opinion (FO) (Kisgen et al., 2007). While still comparatively 
infrequent in Germany, Switzerland and Austria, fairness opinions have become an increasingly 
popular practice during mergers and acquisitions in these countries. Boards obtain FOs for 
several reasons: expert reports reduce information asymmetries between shareholders and the 
target firm’s management, thereby helping to avoid expensive management mistakes (Clements 
& Wisler, 2005; Parijs, 2005). FOs also provide management with additional transaction 
information. Boards of directors of target firms also purchase FOs in order to convince 
shareholders to tender their shares (Bebchuk & Kahan, 1989). We do observe, however, that in 
Germany the likelihood of deal failure is significantly higher when boards render a fairness 
opinion. Legal protection for boards is a further rationale for purchasing expert advice (Bebchuk 
& Kahan, 1989; Davidoff, 2006). Nonetheless, the Smith vs. Van Gorkom decision of 1985 had 
only a short-term impact on the number of FOs obtained by target boards in the US (Bowers, 
2002). In 2005, German law also adopted the Business Judgment Rule. Since that year, we can 
document a significantly higher share of target boards that have decided to purchase fairness 
opinions. 
In several empirical studies, mainly in Anglo-Saxon countries, the practice of target and 
acquirer FOs has been treated. Kisgen et al. (2007) show that FOs on the acquirer side are 
beneficial to the acquirer’s shareholders, especially when two or more reports are issued, but the 
target’s shareholders do not always profit from FOs on the target side. Chen & Sami (2006) 
hold that acquirers are more likely to obtain an FO when facing possible litigation risk. The 
authors also provide evidence for lower acquirer returns when a fairness opinion is used, in 
particular when litigation risk is an issue. Using a large US sample, Bowers & Latham (2004) 
examine the determinants of FOs on both sides. Makhija & Narayanan (2007) find that 
abnormal returns for both the target and the acquirer are lower when an FO is used. Yet, when a 
reputable adviser supplies this target opinion, value is created for the target’s shareholders. In an 
Australian study, Bugeja (2005) observes lower abnormal returns for targets around the release 
of FOs when the opinion adviser has other dealings with the target, even though it is more often 
the case that non-independent experts do not agree with the target firm’s board. 
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Ohta & Yee (2006) postulate a game theoretical approach to explain the use of fairness 
opinions. According to their model, the board’s private incentives determine whether an FO is 
sought. Although current and future target shareholders know that the board acts in its own 
interests, fairness opinions do convey credible information when they report a range for the 
target’s fair value. These valuation ranges in FOs, we observe, are most frequently found in 
Switzerland. Interestingly, in this country conflicts of interest between the target’s management 
and the bidder are an important determinant of fairness opinions.  
Takeover laws in Germany, Switzerland and Austria are similar in various aspects. In all three 
countries, the boards of target firms must issue a written opinion on the offer in which they 
comment on, among other points, the type and amount of the consideration and on the 
consequences for the target’s shareholders. The Swiss report especially addresses the position of 
shareholders, for example, discussion of potential conflicts of interest is mandatory. In contrast, 
other stakeholders play another, greater role in German and Austrian board reports. For 
instance, the offer’s impact on employees is treated. In the three countries, especially in 
Germany and Austria, classification of offer types is also similar. While takeover laws in 
Germany, Switzerland and Austria are much the same, the legal regulation of fairness opinions 
is rather different. German target boards are not required to obtain and disclose FOs, whereas 
both actions are mandatory in Austria. In Switzerland, once having obtained an FO, disclosure 
is compulsory. 
In this paper, incorporating a unique dataset, we are able to provide the first empirical 
evaluation of FO regulation in Germany, Switzerland and Austria. Our objectives are twofold: 
first, we examine the effects of the utilisation of FOs on abnormal target returns in different 
regulatory settings; second, we investigate the determinants of fairness opinions in the 
respective countries. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we describe variables and 
hypotheses, and in section 3, we outline the respective samples and provide descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 details the results for each country, while we examine bidder returns and 
deal success in section 5. In section 6, we then summarise our conclusions and findings. 
2.  Variables and hypotheses 
By estimating multiple linear regression models, we investigate the determinants of abnormal 
stock market reactions around the announcement of the reasoned opinion by the board of 
directors or the supervisory board (or both). The target’s three-day cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) between one trading day prior to and one trading day after the announcement date, 
serves as our response variable. We use CARs based on a market adjusted returns model 
according to their national reference indices.
1 This method is advantageous because no 
estimation period is required (Brown & Warner, 1985; Bugeja, 2005). Since in Germany and 
Austria the board’s reasoned opinion is typically released between one and three weeks after the 
offer document, the estimation period would contain takeover noise. 
To investigate the determinants of utilisation of at least one FO, we estimate (binary) logistic 
regression models. Most of the variables explained below are employed in both regression 
models. 
We expect the recommendation by the target’s board to have different effects on abnormal stock 
returns. While an ‘accept’ recommendation makes a successful bid more likely, offerors will 
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probably not increase the offer price. In addition, the probability of a competing offer will also 
lessen (Bugeja, 2005). ‘Reject’ recommendations could positively influence stock returns as the 
board is disclosing private information that indicates that the target’s fair value is higher than 
the consideration (Ohta & Yee, 2006).  
We then further study the impact of obtaining an FO on the target side with regard to stock 
performance. Such reports communicate valuable information about the target value to 
shareholders, which suggests a positive sign for the variable FO. Yet, if the information is 
irrelevant for shareholders because the expert is not considered independent, we expect a 
negative sign, which is consistent with results from the US and Australia (Makhija & 
Narayanan, 2007; Bugeja, 2005). FO therefore proxies the perceived independence of fairness 
opinions by the capital market. 
A further group of variables proxies for asymmetric information. The target’s board has an 
information advantage over the target shareholders and the offeror although in the latter case it 
is expected to be of a smaller magnitude because of due diligence. We hypothesise that a higher 
degree of information asymmetry leads to higher abnormal returns as the board’s reasoned 
opinion reveals more private information, thus becoming a valuable resource for its recipients. 
Market participants are then able to discount with lower risk-adjusted rates. For the same 
reason, we expect information asymmetry to positively influence the probability of obtaining an 
FO. Owing to its positive relationship with being followed by analysts, the amount of public 
information increases with firm size (Bugeja, 2005). This negative influence of Size on both 
stock returns and the likelihood of rendering an FO could be compensated by the fact that the 
board report and the FO are more valuable in larger transactions (Bowers & Latham, 2004). 
Hence, we predict neither a positive nor a negative influence on both CAR and FO. 
Furthermore, information asymmetry between managers and the capital market is expected to be 
higher in concentrated industries (Bowers & Latham, 2004). We measure market concentration 
in the respective industry sector by the normalised Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (nHHI), using 
market shares based on sales. A third proxy for asymmetric information is the target’s market-
to-book ratio. Growth companies’ boards have more inside information than their counterparts 
do in value firms, since a smaller part of the target’s value appears on the balance sheet. For the 
German sample, we also include the stock index membership of target firms. Membership in a 
selection index is related to stricter disclosure regulation, more media attention and analyst 
following, which leads to a lower degree of asymmetric information. Index is also a proxy for 
size: larger firms are more likely to be members of one of the selection indices.  
Cash offers reduce the board’s incentive to render a fairness opinion; the target side only has 
public information about the bidding company and hence can better assess the value of a cash 
consideration than of share offers (Bowers & Latham, 2004). Cash is also expected to have a 
negative impact on target returns around the release of the board report because both the board 
recommendation and the fairness opinion convey less information than in the case of an 
exchange offer.  
The dummy ForeignBid controls for incomplete information on the target side about the value 
of the bidding company and thus about the adequacy of the (share) offer.  
We also include the variable Leverage in our models. Prior research shows that abnormal 
returns around the announcement of the offer increase with the target’s debt ratio (e.g. Billett & 
Ryngaert, 1997; Raad et al., 1999).  
In a sample consisting of only those targets that obtained such expert reports, we investigate the 
capital market effects of FOs in greater detail. The fairness opinion subsample contains more 
information about the content and disclosure of the reports. The result of the FO is expected to 
influence stock performance in different ways: ‘fair’ opinions increase the probability of a 4 | SEBASTIAN LOBE & NILS-CHRISTIAN SCHENK 
 
successful offer, but price adjustments become less likely (Eddey, 1993). Therefore, we do not 
explicitly hypothesise a positive or a negative coefficient on Fair. In the Swiss sample, all but 
two expert reports are ‘fair’ opinions. Therefore, we do not include this variable in the Swiss 
regression model.  
The board’s willingness to fully disclose the expert’s view is proxied by the dummy variable 
Disclosure. We hypothesise that a fully disclosed fairness opinion positively influences stock 
returns, indicating that the board relies upon the expert’s findings, which makes both the FO and 
the board report more valuable.
2 This variable only applies to the German sample, as disclosure 
of the opinion is mandatory in Austria and Switzerland. Range indicates whether the expert 
reports a valuation range for the target company. Ohta & Yee (2006) identify a theoretical 
relationship between board incentives and valuation ranges. To control for any effect on 
abnormal returns, we include this variable in our models. We only use Range in the Swiss and 
Austrian samples as in Germany only a small share of FOs disclose this, which may be stem 
from the absence of disclosure regulation. 
We further examine the type of bid (variable TypeBid). In Germany, there are three types of 
bids. ‘Normal’ voluntary offers without further specifications are used as a default group. 
German takeover law classifies a voluntary offer as a ‘takeover bid’ when the bidder intends to 
hold more than 30% of voting rights after the offer, as compared with a simple offer of buying 
shares. We expect a ‘takeover bid’ to have a positive influence on abnormal returns on the target 
side. Control premia cannot explain this, because stock prices should have reacted to the 
takeover announcement. Nevertheless, because of these premia more value is at stake and the 
reasoned opinion gains importance.
3 For the same reason, we expect a negative sign for 
mandatory offers, the third type of bid, in which a company that has gained control of more than 
30% of voting rights (not through a takeover bid) must make a bid for the remaining shares. 
Control premia are not an issue in these offers. 
The Austrian Takeover Act classifies offers in a similar fashion including the 30% threshold. In 
Switzerland, there are only two types of offers: a bid must be placed if the offeror has gained a 
third of the voting rights (or up to 49%, depending on the target’s statutes). For voluntary offers, 
no further subdivision is made. 
When the offer is a modification of the initial bid (ChangedBid), boards are reluctant to seek 
expert advice. Often, only those terms of the offer that are not relevant for public information 
are altered. When the offer price has been raised and the FO on the initial offer had already been 
a ‘fair’ opinion, in most cases no more information will be provided by an additional opinion 
letter. Thus, we expect a negative coefficient on this variable. 
In Germany, the board of management and the supervisory board can choose whether to issue a 
joint opinion or separate reports. To control for any reactions in CAR and FO, we include the 
variable TypeBoard in the models. 
                                                      
2 A recent example demonstrates this point: on 27 November 2006, Techem’s Board of Directors issued 
its reasoned opinion after a takeover bid for the company. The managers stated that they had obtained two 
fairness opinions and they also provided the names of the investment banks. But instead of stating the 
experts’ view, they only explained that “based on the financial analyses” they did not consider the offer to 
be fair from a financial point of view. It remains unclear if the investment banks achieved the same result. 
3 In Switzerland, both the fairness opinion and the board report are published together with the offer 
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3.  Sample and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Germany 
Using the list of offers (provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, 
BaFin) for publicly listed companies between January 2002 and February 2007, we manually 
collected data for this period. The initial sample includes 226 offers. In 16 cases, there was no 
published offer document. From our sample, we eliminated nine offers that were share or bond 
repurchases. The potential number of board reports was greater than the number of listed offers 
for two reasons: first, the German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act obliges the 
management board and the supervisory board of the offeree to issue a reasoned opinion on the 
offer and modifications of the initial offer; second, the two boards issue either a joint reasoned 
opinion or separate opinions. In the latter case, we consider both board reports as distinct 
observations because they need not be published on the same day and contain distinct 
recommendations to the target’s shareholders. Since the BaFin database does not list the board 
reports, for the remaining 201 offers, we collected reports from the targets’ websites and 
obtained 133 board opinions. Where a report was unavailable, we contacted the target firm and 
thereby received another 26 reports. Our final sample thus contains 159 observations. Among 
these, 110 are joint opinions, 26 involve reports solely issued by the management board and 23 
are reports produced by the supervisory board. For all three countries, we collected financial 
statement data and stock prices from Thomson Datastream. 
3.2 Switzerland 
The initial Swiss sample consists of 114 public bids from April 1998 to January 2007. We 
obtained the bids from a Swiss Takeover Board database. Data collection proved to be easier 
than for the German sample because in most cases board recommendations are part of the offer 
prospectus. Moreover, security buybacks are listed in a separate table and hence are not part of 
the initial sample. Still, 12 offers were eliminated from the sample because of missing data. The 
remaining 102 observations then make up the final sample. 
3.3 Austria 
Since all data are available in an Austrian Takeover Commission database, collecting data there 
was similar to the Swiss procedure. The initial sample is formed from 34 offers for publicly 
listed companies between April 1999 and February 2007. Four offers are the repurchases of 
securities, so the final sample comprises 30 observations. Unlike in Germany, only the 
management board has to publish a report. In five cases, the supervisory board voluntarily 
published an additional report. We do not treat these reports as observations because they were 
published on the same day and lack a separate recommendation to the shareholders.  
3.4 Descriptive  statistics 
Table A2.1 in the appendix shows target and deal characteristics of the three samples across the 
respective period under review. The results are presented for the complete sample and then 
broken down based on whether at least one FO has been issued. In both Germany and 
Switzerland, transactions in which the target’s board purchases a fairness opinion are 
characterised by a higher average target size, leverage and market-to-book ratio, as compared 
with those without an FO. Whereas the percentage is significantly higher in Swiss takeovers, in 
Germany the share of foreign bidders is smaller (but not significantly) in deals with at least one 
FO. 6 | SEBASTIAN LOBE & NILS-CHRISTIAN SCHENK 
 
Table A2.2 presents the distribution of collected board reports over time. In addition, the 
number and share of transactions with at least one fairness opinion as well as the total number 
of such reports are presented. Since in Austria fairness opinions are mandatory, only additional 
voluntary opinions are displayed for the Austrian sample. The vast majority of target boards that 
seek expert advice on the adequacy of the consideration elicit one fairness opinion. About 60% 
of Swiss boards obtained at least one fairness opinion during the observation period, a markedly 
higher share than Germany’s 36%. Such a comparison should be treated with caution, however, 
because in Germany the disclosure of FOs is voluntary, which differs from Switzerland. The 
percentage of fairness opinions in Switzerland is relatively stable over time and exceeds, with 
only one exception, 50% of board reports in every year. In Germany, we observe an upward 
trend during the period.
4  
4. Results 
4.1 Germany 
Legal framework 
According to the German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act, the target’s board is obliged 
to comment on the offer and on any of its modifications. The reasoned opinion includes a 
mandatory report about the type and amount of the consideration offered. While a concluding 
recommendation to shareholders to either accept or reject the offer is compulsory, in exceptional 
cases boards may abstain from a recommendation while providing feedback for this decision. 
Nonetheless, in practice, more than half of the boards do not give a recommendation.  
In contrast to the board report, there is no obligation for target boards to obtain an FO. Yet, 36% 
of boards state that they have rendered at least one fairness opinion. In November 2005, the Act 
on Corporate Integrity and Modernisation of the Right of Avoidance (UMAG) was passed in 
Germany. As part of this Act, the Business Judgment Rule of the US archetype was transferred 
into German law. Thus, board liability has become important to explain why managers 
commission FOs (Klafs, 2003). To measure the effect of the UMAG on obtaining fairness 
opinions, we add the dummy variable BJR to the models. 
In Germany, public disclosure of FOs is not regulated by law. Boards neither have to state the 
expert’s point of view nor must they mention whether  they obtained a fairness opinion 
(Westhoff, 2006). Therefore, opinion shopping is possible, although not necessary as boards can 
certainly choose an expert who agrees with the board’s opinion. In the period of observation, 
only 44% of the boards that purchased an FO published at least the opinion letter.  
The board report is typically released between one to three weeks after the offer document. It is 
published on the target’s website and since 2007 in the Federal Bulletin. Fairness opinions are 
published the same day, most commonly as an appendix to the report. Thus, we are able to 
separate capital market reaction to these two reports from the reaction to the offer document.  
 
 
                                                      
4 In the next step, outliers are eliminated from all samples. In linear regressions, we identify outliers by 
use of externally studentized residuals and CovRatios. In logistic regressions, we use Pearson residuals. 
Owing to missing data, the number of observations varies in the respective regression models. In the 
Swiss sample, some board reports are published after the offer prospectus. To avoid distortions, we also 
eliminate these observations in the multiple linear regression models. FAIRNESS OPINIONS AND CAPITAL MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY, SWITZERLAND & AUSTRIA | 7 
 
Empirical results 
Table A2.3 presents the determinants of abnormal target returns around the release of the board 
report. Models 1-3 show the outcome for the full sample.  
BoardRec is insignificant for ‘accept’ recommendations, indicating that the opposite effects 
cancel each other, as hypothesised. For ‘reject’ recommendations, the sign is significantly 
positive in Model 1, consistent with the theory that boards convey information about the fair 
value being higher than the offer price.  
The use of fairness opinions does not affect stock performance per se. Market participants seem 
to consider these reports unimportant. The impact of two information asymmetry variables is as 
expected; the coefficients for nHHI and MB are significantly positive. Where information 
asymmetry is high, the board report conveys more private information to the market. In 
addition, we observe a negative and highly significant sign for Size, indicating that the value of 
information provided in the board report decidedly decreases with the increasing size of the 
target firm. We interpret the result as follows: market participants regard the report as an 
instrument to reduce information asymmetries and do not consider the information provided to 
be more valuable when there is more ‘at stake’. Index has no significant impact on stock market 
returns.  
Cash has a positive influence on target returns around the release of the board report, which 
contradicts our hypothesis. Furthermore, abnormal returns increase with higher leverage in the 
target company. The results for TypeBoard show that investors do not attach importance to the 
management’s choice of either issuing a joint opinion or separate reports. As hypothesised, 
abnormal returns are higher when the bidder intends to gain a controlling stake in the target 
(Model 2).  
Models 4 and 5 examine the stock market effects of fairness opinions in greater detail. For 
information asymmetry regressors and transaction size, variable results do not differ from the 
full sample. The coefficient on Fair is not significant in these models; capital markets do not 
consider the information conveyed by the FO valuable. Furthermore, Disclosure is highly 
insignificant, which shows that recipients of the report do not attribute importance to the board’s 
willingness to fully disclose the expert’s view. The market does not deem FOs to be more 
objective and credible when fully issued to the public.  
Models A-C in Table A2.4 display the drivers for utilisation of at least one FO by the target’s 
board in Germany. Most information-asymmetry variables are insignificant; neither market 
concentration in the target’s industry (nHHI) nor growth prospects of the offeree (MB) can 
explain why fairness opinions are obtained. Furthermore, FOs are not sought more often when 
the bidder is a foreign firm. The coefficient on Cash is significantly negative in two models; 
German boards of directors rely on external experts when it is more difficult to assess the 
adequacy of the consideration. In addition, the coefficient on ChangedBid is, as expected, 
significantly negative. TypeBid has a positive and significant sign when the offer is a takeover 
bid; boards solicit FOs to have certified whether the magnitude of the control premium is 
adequate. The probability of obtaining a fairness opinion is higher in the case of the board of 
management issuing a separate report rather than when a joint opinion is presented by both 
boards (Model B). Apparently, the target’s management considers its report more objective 
when the viewpoints of both boards are stated.  
Legal protection plays an important role in the board’s decision to render an FO, as indicated by 
the positive and significant sign on BJR. Before the Business Judgment Rule was passed into 
German law, 29% of boards issued such reports. Since the law has come into effect, the share 
has increased to 44%. The positive and significant coefficient on Size shows that the likelihood 
of buying fairness opinions increases with deal size, which is consistent with results in the US 8 | SEBASTIAN LOBE & NILS-CHRISTIAN SCHENK 
 
(Kisgen et al., 2007). As the extent of asymmetric information is expected to decrease with 
increasing firm size, this result demonstrates that target boards attach more importance to the 
value of the transaction than to information asymmetries when deciding whether to render an 
FO. Using Index instead of Size leads to the same result.  
Robustness 
Size is also proxied by the natural logarithm of the target’s market capitalisation and total assets 
at the end of the fiscal year prior to the offer year. As an alternative formula for Leverage, we 
use the market value of equity instead of the book value. Moreover, the normalised Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index is also calculated using market shares based on the book value of common 
stock rather than on sales. Signs and statistical significance of the three modified variables 
remain unchanged in all linear and logistic regression models. 
Conclusion 
The decision whether to obtain an FO does not have a significant impact on capital market 
returns. Most notably, market participants deem the results and the actual disclosure of an FO 
unimportant. ‘Reject’ recommendations by the boards, however, have a positive impact on 
abnormal returns. Yet only 9% of target boards recommend that their shareholders reject the 
offer while more than half of the boards withhold a final recommendation. Capital markets 
consider board reports to be important when asymmetric information is an issue, whereas 
greater transactions do not increase the value of such reports. In contrast to this, the likelihood 
of obtaining a fairness opinion increases with transaction size while information asymmetries 
only play a secondary role. Legal protection of the target’s management is an important 
determinant in the use of FOs: since Germany passed the Business Judgment Rule, a 
significantly higher share of target boards has obtained at least one fairness opinion.  
4.2 Switzerland 
Legal framework 
The legal basis for FOs in Switzerland differs from Germany in several aspects. According to 
the Stock Exchange Act, the target’s board of directors must outline its response to the offer. 
The Takeover Ordinance, which describes the board’s rights and duties, explicitly allows boards 
to withhold a recommendation by stating the advantages and disadvantages of the offer. Only 
12% of the managers in our sample utilise this practice, however. 
The Takeover Ordinance treats at length the regulation of conflicts of interest between the 
target’s management and the bidder. The board report must not only declare whether board 
members or senior management are exposed to such conflict, it must also describe the measures 
taken to prevent this conflict of interest. With the issuance of an FO, the board of directors 
fulfils this obligation. Thus, it can be seen that FOs play an important role (Westhoff, 2006). We 
include the dummy Conflict in the models to verify whether the probability of using fairness 
opinions is higher in a conflict-of-interest situation. We also hypothesise that Conflict 
negatively affects CAR, as those managers who face a conflict of interest might withhold a 
recommendation on the offer that is in the best interests of the target’s shareholders. 
FOs, part of the board report, must be fully disclosed. Boards can publish a summary in their 
report but then they have to make the fairness opinion available elsewhere (Westhoff, 2006). FAIRNESS OPINIONS AND CAPITAL MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY, SWITZERLAND & AUSTRIA | 9 
 
There is also regulation with regard to the FOs’ content. Besides the basis of the valuation and 
valuation method, applied parameters such as the discount rate must be disclosed.
5 
The board report and the FO are published on the website of the Swiss Takeover Board as a part 
of the offer document. Thus, in contrast to Germany, it is not possible to separately analyse 
capital market reaction to the reports from the reaction to the release of the offer document.  
Empirical results 
Models 6 and 7 in Table A2.3 examine the determinants of abnormal target returns around the 
release of the board report in the full sample. Neither ‘accept’ nor ‘reject’ recommendations 
significantly affect abnormal target returns. The positive and significant coefficient on FO 
confirms the hypothesis that fairness opinions contain valuable information for investors when 
they consider the information source to be independent and objective. This result is not in line 
with the evidence from the German sample. In contrast to the use of FOs, market participants do 
not attach importance to reported conflicts of interest (Model 7).  
The significantly negative influence of Cash on stock performance (although only in Model 6) 
is consistent with the hypothesis that the board report gains in importance when it is more 
difficult for the market to assess the adequacy of the offer price – typically the case when the 
consideration is the offeror’s stock. Yet, as the board report is published as part of the offer 
document, the result is inconsistent with evidence from the US where cash offers positively 
affect stock returns around the time of the takeover announcement (Huang & Walking, 1987).  
Size has a negative and significant sign, consistent with evidence from Germany. Information 
asymmetries are more important than transaction size in explaining the value of information for 
investors obtained by the report. That being stated, two other proxies for asymmetric 
information, nHHI and MB, are not significant.  
Unlike in Germany, the type of bid does not explain abnormal target returns. Indeed, a direct 
comparison of the two countries is not easy because voluntary offers in Switzerland are not 
further subdivided as to whether the bidder wants to gain a controlling share of the target.  
Models 8 and 9 show the determinants of CAR in the fairness opinion subsample. Notably, in 
transactions in which an FO is obtained, both ‘accept’ and ‘reject’ recommendations by the 
board lead to significantly lower abnormal returns compared with the default group (no 
recommendation). To understand why these parameters are significantly negative only in the FO 
subsample, we investigate the rationale for rendering a fairness opinion in Swiss transactions. 
These determinants of fairness opinions are presented in Table A2.4, Models D and E. As 
Model E demonstrates, the likelihood of rendering an FO is significantly higher when there is a 
potential conflict of interest between the target’s management and the bidder. Boards often 
make use of this instrument to comply with the Takeover Ordinance.
6 Furthermore, cash offers 
significantly increase the probability of obtaining an FO – not only in conflict with theory but 
also with the German findings. The sign of MB is significant and positive, supporting the 
hypothesis that FOs are more often rendered when the degree of information asymmetry 
between the target’s board and the capital market is high. The influences of ChangedBid and 
                                                      
5 The Swiss Takeover Board gives recommendations with reference to every offer. In its recommendation 
on the offer by Alpine Select AG to EIC Electricity SA, the Takeover Board explicitly states these 
mandatory components of a fairness opinion. 
6 In some cases, the board even explicitly states that a fairness opinion has been obtained because there is 
a conflict of interest. An example is the report of Aare Tessin AG für Elektrizität on the offer by Motor-
Columbus AG. 10 | SEBASTIAN LOBE & NILS-CHRISTIAN SCHENK 
 
Size correspond with the German sample. As presumed, FOs are less likely to be purchased 
when the offer is mandatory. The sign of ForeignBid is significantly positive, which shows that 
boards are more likely to make use of expert advice when it is more difficult to obtain 
information about the bidder. 
Robustness 
In the linear regression models, the coefficient on Size is not significant when the variable is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the target’s assets and applied to the complete sample. In the 
fairness opinion subsample, Leverage loses its statistical significance when based on market 
values and nHHI is not significant when common stock is used in the formula. Thus, the Swiss 
models are less robust against variable modifications than the German ones. 
Conclusion 
The boards of target firms are more likely to conduct a fairness opinion when facing a conflict 
of interest for two reasons. First, although FOs are not mandatory in Switzerland, the law 
obliges boards to take action in such a situation of conflict. Second, managers have the 
adequacy of the consideration certified by a third party, which is very important when the 
market fears that management is not acting in the interest of its shareholders. The significantly 
positive impact of FO on abnormal returns supports this explanation. In the FO subsample 
alone, ‘accept’ and ‘reject’ recommendations by the board lower target returns, which might be 
owing to the perceived lack of objectivity in these recommendations when conflicts of interest 
are an issue. To verify this, we created a subsample consisting of only those observations in 
which a conflict of interest is reported. The result supports our view: in this subsample, both 
recommendations lead to significantly lower returns as compared with reports that only list the 
advantages and disadvantages of the offer. FOs thus replace the managers’ recommendation and 
are perceived to be objective by market participants. Although conflicts of interest do not 
directly affect stock returns, as the insignificant coefficients on Conflict in both the full sample 
and the fairness opinion subsample indicate, they do reduce the quality of board 
recommendations unless a credible FO is obtained. 
4.3 Austria 
Legal framework 
The target’s board of directors must issue a statement on the offer. In contrast to German law, 
Austrian supervisory boards have the right, but not the duty, to issue an additional report. Only 
one in six supervisory boards comments on the offer and in every observed case they agree with 
the board of directors. These reports are excluded from our sample. According to the Austrian 
Takeover Act, a recommendation to shareholders is not mandatory but the board of directors 
must provide an outline of the arguments for accepting or rejecting the bid. In the period under 
review, as many as 60% of the boards exercised this right. 
This high percentage must be understood in the context of mandatory fairness opinions. The 
board has to appoint an expert of its choice to evaluate the bid and the board’s report. Thus, in 
contrast to Germany and Switzerland, the FO is issued after the board’s report. The expert must 
be either an audit company or a credit institution but only one target firm in the period under 
review chose the latter. No more than two target boards obtained an additional fairness opinion 
before commenting on the offer, which suggests that these two types of FOs substitute each 
other. This is further highlighted by the fact that in one case the issuer of the mandatory opinion 
partly refers to the voluntary opinion without providing its own analysis (Westhoff, 2006). FAIRNESS OPINIONS AND CAPITAL MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY, SWITZERLAND & AUSTRIA | 11 
 
The board has to fully disclose the mandatory opinion, which is then published on the Austrian 
Takeover Commission’s website. On average, the board’s report and the FO are published 10 
days after the offer document, making it possible to analyse capital market response to these 
reports separately from the reaction to the offer. 
Empirical results 
Since FOs are mandatory, we only investigate the determinants of abnormal target returns 
around the release of the board report. Model 10 in Table A2.3 presents the results. The 
coefficient on TypeBid ‘Control’ is positive and significant. When the bid is a voluntary offer in 
which the offeror might gain a controlling stake in the target company, both the board’s report 
and FO contain information about the adequacy of the control premium. As predicted, market 
participants consider this information useful. The significantly positive sign of nHHI supports 
the hypothesis that the board’s report is more valuable when public information about the target 
is scarce as is the case in concentrated industries. The result for Size is inconsistent with 
evidence from Germany and Switzerland, which may be the result of the small sample size. MB 
as a third proxy for asymmetric information is not statistically significant. The most important 
result, however, is that both the recommendation by the board of directors and the FO fail to 
explain abnormal target returns. Furthermore, valuation ranges for the target company in the FO 
do not have an impact on stock returns. 
Robustness 
The variable nHHI remains significantly positive when market shares are based on common 
stock. Size and Leverage are insignificant for both the initial and modified variable definitions.  
Conclusion 
Since the mandatory FO is prepared after the board’s report, the target’s managers do not seek 
an objective third-party opinion unless they render an additional, voluntary FO. This might be 
perceived as problematic, especially when managers face a conflict of interest. Moreover, the 
expert’s obligatory assessment of the board report is of limited value as the target’s managers 
can mandate an expert of their choice.
7 Market participants therefore do not attach value to the 
reports, as our empirical results indicate. 
5.  Abnormal bidder returns and deal success 
Abnormal bidder returns 
The percentage of bidders with listed shares is significantly higher in Switzerland (42%) than in 
Germany (28%) or in Austria (20%).
8 Prior evidence on bidder returns finds that acquirers’ 
shareholders do not gain in takeovers (e.g. Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Because in Switzerland the 
board’s report is part of the offer prospectus, both the release of the offer document and the 
board’s opinion influence the observed bidder returns. We observe positive but insignificant 
abnormal returns in Switzerland. We estimate multiple linear regression models to analyse the 
determinants of abnormal stock performance (results not reported). None of the variables 
described in section 2 significantly influence bidder returns in this small sample. In the German 
sample, bidder returns are significantly lower when the target’s management obtains an FO, 
                                                      
7 Although according to the Austrian Takeover Act, the expert must be independent of the target, none of 
the experts in our sample consider the board report incorrect, inappropriate or incoherent.   
8 Owing to the small sample size, we neither investigate bidder returns around the release of the board 
report nor deal success in the Austrian sample. 12 | SEBASTIAN LOBE & NILS-CHRISTIAN SCHENK 
 
indicating that the acquirer’s shareholders perceive an improvement in the target board’s 
bargaining power. All other variables are insignificant. 
Deal success 
We define a deal as ‘successful’ either when the bidder gains a stake in the target that exceeds 
50% or when the acquired share allows the bidder to initiate a squeeze-out of minority 
shareholders. Otherwise, the deal is ‘unsuccessful’. The default group is comprised of offers 
with no reported final result and of those in which the bidder’s stake in the offeree exceeds the 
squeeze-out threshold before the offer. The most striking result in the German sample is that the 
use of a target FO significantly increases the likelihood of deal failure. In theory, FOs identify 
‘bad’ transactions. By making ‘not fair’ recommendations, the probability of deal failure 
increases. Yet, this proposition does not hold when in reality these recommendations are scarce 
(Kisgen et al., 2007). In support of an alternative view is the fact that in Germany only 5% of 
fairness opinions state that the consideration is not fair; managers of target firms purchase FOs 
with ‘fair’ recommendations to convince their shareholders to tender their shares to the bidder. 
This is especially the case when the transaction is a bad deal for a target’s shareholders and 
management does not act in their interest. The empirical evidence from Germany suggests that 
FOs identify bad transactions even while recommending the consideration as fair and 
reasonable. In Switzerland, neither the use of FOs nor conflicts of interest affect the probability 
of deal success or deal failure. 
6.  Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we provide the first empirical evidence of fairness opinions in Europe. Despite 
some similarities among the takeover laws in Germany, Switzerland and Austria, the legal 
frameworks concerning fairness opinions are rather different. We examine the determinants of 
fairness opinions in the respective countries. We also investigate whether the use of fairness 
opinions and other deal characteristics such as information asymmetries and transaction size 
make the board report more valuable for shareholders.  
In Switzerland, fairness opinions create value for the target’s shareholders. Moreover, conflicts 
of interest positively influence the likelihood of purchasing a fairness opinion. Because in a 
conflict of interest, board recommendations are not perceived to be credible by the capital 
market, we conclude that fairness opinions replace board reports as a source of objective 
information. In Germany, legal protection is an important aspect in explaining the rationale 
behind obtaining fairness opinions. The use of fairness opinions does not influence the 
abnormal returns of the target, but failure of the deal does become more likely. Thus, we 
conclude that fairness opinions identify ‘bad’ transactions. Fairness opinions are mandatory in 
Austria. Since the boards of target firms choose the expert, market participants do not consider 
these reports to be objective.  
In Germany, an acquirer’s returns are lower when a fairness opinion is obtained on the target 
side. 
Overall, our empirical results indicate that boards do not obtain fairness opinions with the 
intention of intervening in capital markets or improving their negotiating position during the 
offer period. Board reports and fairness opinions do convey information from the target’s 
management to the public, however, especially when asymmetric information is present. The 
main determinants of fairness opinions include issues of accountability and legal requirements 
for boards. Switzerland is the only country in our study where, at least when conflicts of interest 
are an issue, fairness opinions simultaneously fit the needs of the target’s management and 
shareholders.  | 13 
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Appendix 1. List of Variables 
1.  CAR: Cumulative abnormal return for the target from one trading day prior to the release of the 
board report until one trading day after. 
2.  FO: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target’s board obtains at least one fairness opinion. 
3.  BoardRec: Dummy variable coded as ‘accept’ if the target’s board recommends acceptance of the 
offer; it is coded as ‘reject’ if the board recommends not accepting the offer. The default is no 
recommendation. In Austria, we observe no ‘reject’ recommendations. 
4.  Size: The natural logarithm of the target’s net sales or revenues at the end of the fiscal year prior to 
the offer year. 
5.  nHHI: The normalised Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in the target’s industry, using market shares 
based on sales; we use the sectoral allocation by Deutsche Börse Group and we adopt the same 
classification in the Austrian sample. In the Swiss study, we apply the Industry Classification 
Benchmark that the Swiss Exchange utilises for sectoral allocation. 
6.  Leverage: The target’s debt-to-equity ratio based on book value. 
7.  MB: The target’s market-to-book ratio. 
8.  Cash: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the consideration is all cash; Germany and Switzerland only. 
9.  Index: In German sample only – the dummy is equal to 1 if the target is part of one of the 
Deutsche Börse selection indices on the day of the board report. We consider five indices: DAX, 
MDAX, SDAX, TecDAX and Nemax50. Membership in broader selection indices such as CDAX 
or no membership in any index is coded as zero. 
10.  TypeBid: In Germany and Austria, the dummy variable is coded as ‘Control’ if the bidder intends 
to hold a controlling stake in the target after the offer (30% of voting rights in both countries) and 
coded as ‘Mandatory’ if the offer is such; the default is a voluntary bid without the intention to 
gain a controlling stake. In Switzerland, the dummy variable is coded as ‘Mandatory’ when the 
offer is mandatory whereas the default is a voluntary bid. 
11.  ForeignBid: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bidder is a foreign firm. 
12.  ChangedBid: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bid is a modification of the initial bid; German and 
Swiss samples only. 
13.  Fair: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the fairness opinion states that the consideration is ‘fair’; 
German and Austrian samples only. 
14.  Disclosure: This dummy variable is coded as 1 when the target’s board publishes at least the 
opinion letter and as 0 when the fairness opinion is only mentioned in the board report; German 
sample only. 
15.  Range: Dummy equal to 1 if a range for the target’s fair value is reported in the fairness opinion; 
German and Austrian samples only. 
16.  Success: Dummy variable coded as ‘success’ when the bidder gains a stake in the target that 
exceeds 50% or when the acquired share allows the bidder to initiate a squeeze-out of minority 
shareholders. Squeeze-out thresholds are 95% of initial capital in Germany and 98% of voting 
rights in Switzerland. The variable is coded as ‘no success’ if neither threshold is exceeded. The 
default group is comprised of offers with no reported final result and of those in which the bidder’s 
stake in the offeree exceeds the squeeze-out threshold before the offer. Results are not reported. 
Applies to the German and Swiss samples only. 
17.  TypeBoard: Dummy variable coded as ‘Directors’ (‘Supervisory’) if the board of directors 
(supervisory board) issues the reasoned opinion; the default is a joint opinion; German sample 
only. 
18.  BJR: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the offer prospectus is dated after the Act on Corporate 
Integrity and Modernisation of the Right of Avoidance (UMAG) has come into effect; German 
sample only. 
19.  Conflict: Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target’s board is exposed to a conflict of 
interest; Swiss sample only. 
 
Note: Financial statement data is quoted in EUR for the German and Austrian samples and in CHF for the 
Swiss sample. | 15 
Appendix 2. Tables 
Table A2.1 Target and deal characteristics 
 Germany  Switzerland  Austria 
Variable  Full sample  FO subsample  No FO subsample  Full sample  FO subsample  No FO subsample  Full sample 
n  159  57 102  102  61 41  30 
Size 18.9158 
(18.8016) 
19.9437 
(19.9614) 
18.3808*** 
(18.3909)*** 
19.6365 
(19.7934) 
20.1707 
(20.0539)  
18.8610** 
(19.1892)*** 
19.2176 
(18.7636) 
Leverage 8.6830 
(1.1380) 
9.05237 
(1.7608) 
8.47377 
(1.0703)* 
5.1253 
(1.7710) 
5.9514 
(2.4429) 
4.0868 
(1.2936) 
29.2977 
(2.6996) 
MB 12.1767 
(6.9910) 
16.4815 
(10.0000) 
9.7373** 
(5.6361)*** 
22.0229 
(7.9826) 
33.8127 
(11.5162) 
7.2014* 
(4.3321)*** 
5.3211 
(3.1093) 
ForeignBid  0.2956  0.2456 0.3235  0.4314 0.5246 0.2927**  0.3000 
Notes: Table A2.1 shows target and deal characteristics of the three samples. The results are presented for the full sample as well as broken down according to the use of at least 
one fairness opinion. In Austria, such expert reports are mandatory, so only one column is provided for this sample. The respective periods under review are January 2002–
February 2007 (Germany), April 1998–January 2007 (Switzerland) and April 1999–February 2007 (Austria). Financial statement data is quoted in EUR for the German and 
Austrian samples and in CHF for the Swiss sample. In the German and the Swiss samples, ***, ** and * indicate significant differences in the means (medians)/proportions 
between the two respective subsamples, at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. All tests are two-sided. Means (medians) are reported for Size, Leverage and MB. 
Proportions are reported for ForeignBid. 
The sample size reported is smaller in the respective rows when data is missing for the variable. Outliers are not eliminated. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A2.2 Distribution of board reports and fairness opinions by year 
 Germany  Switzerland  Austria 
Year Number  of 
board reports 
At least 
one FO (%) 
Number of 
FOs 
Number of 
board reports
At least 
one FO (%) 
Number of 
FOs 
Number of 
board reports 
At least one 
voluntary 
FO (%) 
1998  –  –  –  1  1  (100.0%)  1 – – 
1999 –  –  –  12  11  (91.7%)  11  3  0  (0.0%) 
2000  –  –  –  10  6  (60.0%)  6 5 0  (0.0%) 
2001  –  –  –  8  4  (50.0%)  4 2 0  (0.0%) 
2002  13  2 (15.4%)  2  8  4 (50.0%)  4  6  0 (0.0%) 
2003  20  7 (35.0%)  7  15  10 (66.7%)  12  6  0 (0.0%) 
2004  31  8 (25.8%)  8  15  5 (33.3%)  5  4  1 (25.0% ) 
2005  32  10 (31.3%)  11  18  10 (55.6%)  10  3  1 (33.3%) 
2006  48  24  (50.0%)  27  14  9  (64.3%)  9 0 0  (0.0%) 
2007  15  6 (40.0%)  6  1  1 (100.0%)  1  1  0 (0.0%) 
Total  159  57 (35.8%)  61  102  61 (59.8%)  63  30  2 (6.7%) 
Notes: Table A2.2 shows the distribution of board reports and fairness opinions across the total period in each of the three samples. The number (share) of transactions with at 
least one fairness opinion as well as the total number of such reports are presented. Since in Austria expert opinions are mandatory, only additional voluntary opinions are 
displayed for this sample. The respective periods under review are January 2002–February 2007 (Germany), April 1998–January 2007 (Switzerland) and April 1999–February 
2007 (Austria). 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A2.3 Abnormal returns around the release of the board report 
 Germany  Switzerland  Austria 
  Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
FO Sub-
sample 
FO Sub- 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
FO Sub-
sample 
FO Sub-
sample 
Full 
sample 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
BoardRec  ‘Accept’ -0.0021 -0.0031 -0.0019 -0.0142**  -0.0100  -0.0162 -0.0157 -0.0657**  -0.0637***  0.0072 
BoardRec  ‘Reject’  0.0106*  0.0084 0.0098 -0.0084 -0.0008  -0.0151 -0.0108 -0.1235*** -0.0887**  – 
Cash  0.0190*** 0.0194*** 0.0166**  0.0251**  0.0121  -0.0224** -0.0136  -0.0296** -0.0187  – 
FO  -0.0025 -0.0050 -0.0062 –  –  0.0169* –  –  –  – 
Leverage  0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0003**  0.0005*** 0.0003*  -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0009**  -0.0009**  -0.0002 
Size -0.0027***  -0.0029*** –  -0.0036*  –  -0.0039** -0.0035** 0.0029  0.0017  -0.0015 
MB  0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0004*** 0.0009*** 0.0006***  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0002  0.0003  -0.0026 
nHHI  0.0134* 0.0133* –  0.0349***  –  -0.0058 -0.0016 -0.0651*** -0.0591***  0.0639* 
TypeBoard  ‘Directors’  -0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0011 0.0049 0.0051  –  –  –  –  – 
TypeBoard 
‘Supervisory’ 
-0.0059 -0.0054 -0.0039 -0.0024 0.0032  –  –  –  –  – 
TypeBid  ‘Control’  – 0.0081*  – 0.0119*  –  – – – –  0.0501** 
TypeBid  ‘Mandatory’  –  -0.0007 –  0.0033 –  -0.0078 -0.0104 –  -0.0106  0.0055 
ForeignBid  – 0.0006  – 0.0133  –  – 0.0180**  – 0.0201**  0.0038 
Fair  – – – -0.0073  -0.0066  – – – –  0.0061 
Disclosure  – – – 0.0008  -0.0020  – – – –  – 
Range  – – – – –  – – 0.0086  0.0109  0.0116 
Index  – – 0.0021  – 0.0015 – – – –  – 
Conflict  – – – – –  – 0.0086  -0.0077  -0.0130  – 
Intercept  0.0206 0.0205 -0.0208*** 0.0189 -0.0183*  0.1048***  0.0853**  0.0565 0.0621  0.0091 
n  133   133   133   46  46  57  57  34   34   19 
Adjusted R
2  0.1778 0.1944 0.1262 0.5286 0.3411  0.1312 0.1703 0.5202 0.5940  0.5779 
Notes: In Table A2.3, we estimate multiple linear regression models. The target’s three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) between one trading day prior to and one trading 
day after the announcement date serves as a response variable. In the table, ***, ** and * indicate that the regression coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 18 | SEBASTIAN LOBE & NILS-CHRISTIAN SCHENK 
 
Table A2.4 Determinants of fairness opinions 
 Germany  Switzerland 
Variable  Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E 
Cash -1.6106*  -1.8007**  -1.6096  1.6660**  1.9802** 
ChangedBid -3.6652***  -3.8306***  -4.1934*** -2.4915*  -3.1913** 
ForeignBid -0.7314  -0.5467  -0.5365  1.4405**  2.0989*** 
Leverage 0.0067  -0.0042  0.0062  -0.0732  – 
Size 0.2467*  0.2529*  –  0.4755**  0.4167** 
MB 0.0102  -0.0007  -0.0050  0.1140**  0.1098* 
nHHI -1.1601  -1.5690  –  –  – 
TypeBid ‘Control’  1.2138**  1.3921**  1.0944*  –  – 
TypeBid ‘Mandatory’  -1.1115  -1.0407  -1.1695  -1.5741*  – 
TypeBoard ‘Directors’  –  1.5169**  –  –  – 
TypeBoard ‘Supervisory’  –  0.1528  –  –  – 
BJR 0.8558*  0.9551*  1.4613***  –  – 
Index –  –  2.3370***  –  – 
Conflict –  –  –  –  2.3098*** 
Intercept -4.1751  -4.2955  -0.6330 -11.0601***  -12.6760*** 
n 
  139   139  139  71  71  
Pseudo R
2 0.3348  0.3359  0.4121  0.4398  0.4656 
Notes: In Table A2.4, we estimate (binary) logistic regression models to investigate the determinants of the utilisation of at least one fairness opinion by the target’s 
management. In the table, ***, ** and * indicate that the regression coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. For statistical 
reasons (quasi-complete separation), nHHI was not included in Models D and E and Leverage was not included in Model E. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
 
About ECMI 
 
The European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) was established as an independent non-
profit organisation in October 1993, in a collaborative effort by the European Federation 
of Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS), the Federation of European Securities 
Exchanges (FESE) and the International Securities Market Association (ISMA), now the 
International Capital Market Association (ICMA). ECMI is managed and staffed by the 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. Its membership is composed of 
private firms, regulatory authorities and university institutes. 
European capital markets have experienced rapid growth in recent years, corresponding 
to the gradual shift away from relationship banking as a source of funding and at the 
same time, have had to absorb and implement the massive output of EU-level regulation 
required to create a single market for financial services. These developments, combined 
with the immense challenges presented European financial institutions by the 
globalisation of financial markets, highlight the importance of an independent entity to 
undertake and disseminate research on European capital markets. 
The principal objective of ECMI is therefore to provide a forum in which market 
participants, policy-makers and academics alike can exchange ideas and opinions 
concerning the efficiency, stability, liquidity, integrity, fairness and competitiveness of 
European capital markets and discuss the latest market trends. These exchanges are 
fuelled by the publications ECMI regularly produces for its members: quarterly 
newsletters, annual reports, a statistical package, regular commentary and research 
papers, as well as occasional workshops and conferences. ECMI also advises European 
regulators on policy-related matters, acts as a focal point for interaction between 
academic research, market sentiment and the policy-making process, and promotes a 
multidisciplinary and multidimensional approach to the subject. 
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